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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

6 October 1981

NOTE FOR: [redacted] Senior Review Panel

Re your question this A.M. concerning Congressional action to clear legal underbrush in order that hearings [redacted] can proceed: As yet, no formal waivers have come to a Senate vote on a) Sec 669 (Symington Amendment) of the Foreign Assistance Act that prohibits military assistance to countries engaged in building an enrichment capacity; and b) Sec 670 (Glenn Amendment) prohibiting such assistance to countries building reprocessing capabilities.

[redacted]

cc: [redacted]
SA/NPI
[redacted] OSWR
NIC/AG

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EDITORIALS

LOS ANGELES TIMES 1 October 1981 (2)

MX: It Needs More Thought

For years, concern has been growing among defense planners over how much of the land-based U.S. intercontinental missile force could survive a Soviet attack. The Russian ICBM arsenal is more than ample to target each one of the 1,052 missiles the United States has in hardened silos. More to the point, the accuracy of Soviet missiles has improved greatly, adding to the vulnerability of American ICBMs. The problem facing successive Presidents has been how to improve the survivability of these intercontinental missiles, and in so doing lessen the possible temptation to the Soviet Union to try to destroy them all at once.

The land-based MX missile has been offered as one answer. Though the MX could be based in silos, it could also be mobile. This ability to move the missile around from launch site to launch site would greatly increase the potential number of targets the Soviets would have to hit if they hoped to wipe out the land-based U.S. strategic deterrent. The Carter Administration proposed building 4,600 MX shelters in the deserts of Nevada and Utah, and 200 MX missiles that could be secretly shuttled among them. The trick for the Russians would then be to figure out which shelters held the missiles. The odds against their doing that, it was theorized, would assure the survivability of many MX missiles.

But powerful opposition developed to the Carter plan. The MX system as envisaged would cover immense desert territories, and its construction and maintenance could lead to major social and environmental problems in the states affected. President Reagan, who inherited the MX issue, has apparently come to a decision that takes this political opposition into account. Reagan is said to be ready to announce this week a go-ahead on an MX system, but one that would involve only 100 missiles to be deployed among 1,000 shelters. In short, a smaller system, at less cost and with fewer political problems.

But an effective system? Almost certainly not. What is likely, rather, is a system whose obsolescence would be assured from the start.

This is the conclusion of the Office of Technology Assessment, which provides technical analysis to Congress. What the office found was that "if the Soviets continue to expand their ICBM forces at the same rate as they did in the 1970s," then the United States would have to have 360 MX missiles hidden in 8,250 shelters by 1990 to assure the survival of 100 MX missiles in an attack. By 1995, there would have to be 550 missiles in 12,500 shelters. In other words, the Russians, if they wanted to, could target each new shelter as it came along. The United States would spend vast sums of money and tear up a lot of desert land, only in the end to find it had made no strategic gain.

There are not now and never have been any easy answers to the question of how to deploy the MX or what to use in its place. But an absence of easy answers is no reason to choose a bad answer, and the land-based MX system Reagan is said to have chosen is a bad answer. The MX issue needs more thought. There has to be a better way to do what defense planners say must be done.

NEW YORK TIMES 2 October 1981

Pakistan's Choice: Aid or a Bomb

In one vital respect, Pakistan is a deserving customer in the Reagan Administration's thriving arms bazaar. Its security is plainly threatened by the Soviet thrust into Afghanistan. More than two million Afghans have fled into its territory and Soviet MIG's recently pursued them over the frontier, strafing a Pakistani border post.

So why not shore it up with a $3.2 billion arms deal, including 40 high-performance F-16's? One problem is that arms alone won't assure the security of Pakistan or the repressive and apparently unpopular Zia regime. Moreover, Pakistan has another hostile neighbor, India, which relies on Soviet arms to preserve superiority. And their enmity has been further complicated by General Zia's obvious desire to follow India into the nuclear club.

Even with the American aid at risk, he refuses to renounce that ambition. The State Department's arms salesman, James Buckley, reports that Pakistan will go no further than "understanding" that a test explosion would write finis to the five-year deal with the United States. Congress, at the least, ought to write this understanding into Pakistan's $100 million economic aid appropriation.

The Senate has too quickly waived a law that was meant to block aid to nations that won't sign a

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SAN DIEGO UNION 24 September 1981 (2 October)

Salvaging AWACS

Secretary of State Alexander Haig is putting on a brave face, but he surely knows that a Senate controlled by President Reagan's own party is perilously close to vetoing the administration's proposed sale of AWACS radar planes to Saudi Arabia.

A defeat of that magnitude on a major foreign policy issue would do more than simply embarrass the president. It would diminish his credibility in the world at a time when it is especially important for the president of the United States to be seen as a leader who can deliver on his commitments.

Credibility is the coin of the realm in international diplomacy, no less so than in domestic politics. Mr. Reagan can hardly stare down the Russians, advance the Middle East peace process, and surmount all the other challenges to American interests around the world if he cannot deliver the support of a Republican-controlled Senate.

We don't mean to overstate the consequences of a Senate veto of the Saudi arms deal. Most of the Reagan administration's foreign policy initiatives enjoy ample, if not always overwhelming, congressional support. Still, an AWACS defeat would undeniably weaken the American hand in the Middle East. That much is certain.

Accordingly, both the president and his Senate opponents share a vested interest in exploring the prospects for an AWACS compromise that would avoid tarnishing Mr. Reagan's international credentials even as it softened the objections of those who oppose the sale.

Such a compromise, while difficult, is far from impossible. The Pentagon has already hinted that AWACS delivered to Saudi Arabia would lack certain features and capabilities most alarming to Israel and its supporters on Capitol Hill.

Additional safeguards expanding the role of American military personnel in operating the five Saudi AWACS aircraft might also be negotiated with the Senate, and with the Saudis.

The key to successful negotiations along these lines would be absolute discretion and a cooperative approach by the administration, Senate opponents, and the Saudis themselves.

The Saudis aren't likely to abide any overt diminution of their sovereignty, nor can they reasonably be expected to do so. They just might, however, be amenable to private understandings that could ease Israeli, and Senate, fears over the potential use of AWACS planes against Israel.

They might be even more amenable if these discreet restrictions were proposed as the essential price of salvaging the AWACS package from defeat in the Senate.

We continue to believe that the sale of AWACS aircraft together with the other components of an $8.5 billion package intended to provide Saudi Arabia a modern air defense system would serve vital American interests in the Persian Gulf-Middle East region.

Those interests are not only military and economic, but political as well. The prospects for an eventual Middle East settlement won't be enhanced if pro-Western Arab states including Saudi Arabia find Washington an unreliable friend.

So long as there is any significant hope of winning the minimum Senate support for the AWACS package as currently proposed; the administration ought to continue its lobbying effort.

But if those efforts fall short, the White House, the Senate, and the Saudis would do well to recognize that an amended AWACS deal is far better than none at all.

PAKISTAN'S CHOICE...Continued

nuclear pledge. If the foreign aid bill is permitted to come to a vote, the House can still qualify that waiver and avoid any misunderstanding. Pakistan will have to choose between usable weapons and a costly nuclear badge.

The larger lesson in all this, once again, is that weapons cannot be a substitute for wise diplomacy. As the Administration privately concedes, Pakistan's security would have been served, and at lesser risk to the region, by F-5G interceptors instead of the F-16. But, as with the Awacs aircraft rashly promised to Saudi Arabia, a penny of symbolism now outweighs a pound of sense. Having obtained Saudi financing, the Pakistanis insist on buying the best.

India has certainly contributed to this increasing competition with its nuclear explosion and billion-dollar deals with the Soviet Union and France. The real challenge for American diplomacy will be to hold open the chance that both India and Pakistan can be made to recognize their interest in reducing the costly hostility between them.